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Chapter 10: Federal Child Welfare 
Legislation* 
by Frank E. Vandervort 1 
§ 10.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of federal statutes that impact the practice 
of child welfare law. Since the enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act in 1974 (CAPTA), the federal government has played an ever 
increasing role in handling child maltreatment cases. 
In the early history of America, the welfare of children who were abused, 
neglected, or abandoned was addressed only by local authorities. Later, individual 
states developed responses to cases of child maltreatment.2 Over the past four decades 
the federal government has played an ever increasing role in child welfare. With few 
exceptions, federal child welfare legislation is not substantive.3 That is, the federal 
government cannot tell any state how it must handle individual cases of child 
maltreatment. Rather, most federal legislation establishes funding schemes by which 
an individual state may avail itself of federal funds if it complies with various 
requirements established by the federal government. While a state may decline to take 
the federal dollars offered through the various programs, and thereby release itself 
from any duty to comply with the federal requirements, as a practical matter the 
funding provided by the federal government is essential to states' efforts to deliver 
* Portions of this chapter are adapted from the earlier version, Miriam Rollin, Frank Vandervort & 
Ann Haralambie, Federal Child Welfare and Policy: Understanding the Federal Law and Funding 
Process, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE 
AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES (Marvin Ventrell & Donald N. Duquette 
eds., 2005). I wish to thank Jonathan Fazzola for his helpful research assistance in preparing this 
chapter. 
Frank E. Vandervort, J.D., is Clinical Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law 
School where he teaches in the Child Advocacy Law Clinic and the Juvenile Justice Clinic, teaches 
Juvenile Justice, and consults with the School of Social Work on child maltreatment issues. He is co-
author of the recently released book: K. STALLER, K. C. FALLER, F. VANDERVORT, W. c. BIRDSALL & 
J. HENRY, SEEKING JUSTICE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: SHIFTING BURDENS & SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES 
(Columbia University Press 2010). 
2 See Chapter 9, The History of Child Welfare Law. 
3 A notable exception is the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. For a 
discussion of the ICWA, see Chapter 12. 
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child welfare services. Today every state accepts federal funding; they are at pains to 
comply with the requirements of the various federal statutes. 
§ 10.2 The Early Years 
Since the earliest days after European contact with America, the law has provided 
for the protection of children from maltreatment by their parents or legal custodians.4 
During the pre-Civil War period, the protection of children was primarily the 
responsibility of local authorities, who were assisted by various private organi-
zations. 5 In the 1860s, state governments began playing a role in child protection by 
providing funding assistance to local communities and oversight regarding the use of 
those monies.6 
The federal government's role in child welfare began with the 1909 White House 
Conference on the Care of Dependent Children.7 Among the recommendations that 
emerged from this meeting of the national child welfare leadership was the creation of 
an office within the federal government to address the needs of abused, neglected, and 
dependent children.8 In April of 1912 the Children's Bureau was established and 
charged with the duty to "'Investigate and report ... upon all matters pertaining to the 
welfare of children .... "'9 
The role of the federal government in child well-being began with the passage of 
the Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA). Among other efforts on behalf of children and 
families, the SSA provided for the Children's Bureau to work with state authorities to 
improve the provision of child welfare services to abused and neglected children. ' 0 
For four decades following the enactment of the SSA, the federal government's role 
in child welfare was modest, limited to the provision of AFDC benefits for eligible 
children placed in the foster care system. But in the 1970s the federal government, 
acting pursuant to the spending clause of the United States Constitution," drama-
tically increased its role in all phases of preventing and responding to child 
maltreatment. Since then, the federal role in the child welfare system has steadily 
increased to the point that today it plays a dominant role. 12 
4 JOHN E. B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 11-13 (2006). See 
also Chapter 9, The History of Child Welfare Law. 
5 Id. at 11, 58. 
6 Id at58. 
7 Id at 58-59. 
8 /d.at59,61. 
9 Id at61 (citation omitted). 
10 Id at 63. 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. 
12 JOHN E. B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 64 (2006). 
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§ 10.3 Current Federal Law 
Current federal law provides a detailed scheme for funding all areas of child 
welfare practice. Although federal law provides funding for all phases along the child 
welfare continuum-from primary prevention through early intervention to 
termination of parental rights and adoption-it still provides inadequate amounts of 
money to deal with the problem of child maltreatment comprehensively. 
§ 10.3.1 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
Congress expanded its involvement in child welfare in 1974 with the enactment 
of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). 13 CAPTA must be 
periodically reauthorized. Broadly speaking, CAPT A accomplishes two goals. First, it 
establishes federal programs for research on the causes of child abuse and neglect and 
for implementation of programs of best practice in the states. CAPT A permits the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to appoint an 
advisory board on child abuse and neglect for the purpose of making recommen-
dations to the Secretary and to congressional committees "concerning specific issues 
relating to child abuse and neglect."14 Additionally, the statute requires that the DHHS 
establish a Clearinghouse for child welfare information. 15 The purpose of the 
Clearinghouse is to "maintain, coordinate and disseminate information" regarding 
programs aimed at the "prevention, assessment, identification, and treatment of child 
abuse and neglect and hold the potential for broad scale implementation and 
replication."16 The Secretary of DHHS is also charged with "carry[ing] out a continu-
ing interdisciplinary program of research ... that is designed to provide information 
needed to better protect children from abuse or neglect and to improve the well-being 
of abused or neglected children."17 Additionally, the DHHS must conduct research 
regarding the national incidence of child abuse and neglect. 18 
Secondly, the statute provides states with a mechanism for accessing federal 
dollars to support their efforts to prevent and respond to cases of child maltreatment, 
including but not limited to neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse. The Secretary 
of DHHS must make grants to states "based on the population of children under the 
age of 18 in each state that applies for a grant."19 If a state wishes to draw down the 
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101 et seq. For a comprehensive treatment of the most recent version of CAPT A, see 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services et al., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act: 
Including Adoption Opportunities and the Abandoned Infants Assistance Act, as Amended by the 
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003 (June 25, 2003), available at 
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/cblaws/capta03/capta_manual.pdf. 
14 42 U.S.C. § 5102(a). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 5104. 
16 42 u.s.c. § 5104(b). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 5105(a)(l). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 5105(a)(2). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a). 
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financial support provided by CAPT A, it must present to the DHHS for approval a 
state plan that complies with the commands of the statute.20 The application must 
address each of the areas of concern established in the statute. Basically, the state's 
application must establish a comprehensive program for: (1) mandated reporting of 
suspected child abuse or neglect; (2) responding to those reports with assessment 
methods that will distinguish valid from invalid reports; and (3) taking action that is 
appropriate to the level of risk of harm to the child involved.2 1 
Among CAPT A's numerous provisions are several that may be of particular 
interest to child welfare lawyers. First, the statute provides that if judicial proceedings 
are necessary to protect a child, a guardian ad litem (GAL) must be appointed to 
represent the child's interests. That GAL "may be an attomey."22 The state must 
ensure that GALs appointed to represent children in child protective proceedings have 
received "training appropriate to the role. "23 A GAL appointed to represent a child in 
a protective proceeding is to "obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of the situation 
and the needs of the child" as well as "make recommendations to the court concerning 
the best interests of the child."24 
A portion of the federal dollars provided to the states through CAPT A may be 
used to train professionals, including GALs, regarding the prevention of and response 
to child maltreatment.25 If implemented, these training programs may include 
information regarding the legal rights of children and families. 26 
Additionally, CAPT A provides federal funding for states to improve their child 
protection systems, by "improving legal preparation and representation" relating to 
"(i) procedures for appealing and responding to appeals of substantiated reports of 
abuse and neglect; and (ii) provisions for the appointment of an individual ... to 
represent a child in judicial proceedings."27 That is, a state may use a portion of its 
federal CAPT A dollars to ensure there is a process in place for a parent to appeal a 
CPS finding that he or she maltreated his or her child and for the appointment of a 
representative for the child when a child protection action is filed with the court. 
Finally, when CAPT A was reauthorized and amended in 2003 as part of the Keeping 
Children and Families Safe Act, among the additions to the statute was one that 
permits each state to decide whether court proceedings regarding child abuse and 
neglect will be open to the public.28 
20 The commands of state plans are comprehensive and detailed. Space limitations do not permit a truly 
detailed discussion of the requirements of a state plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 5 l06a(b) (detailing the 
requirements of a state plan). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 5106a. 
22 42 U.S.C. 5106a(b )(2)(A)(xiii). 
23 42 U.S.C. 5106a(b )(2)(A)(xiii). 
24 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b )(2)(A)(xiii). 
25 42 U.S.C. 5l06(a)(l). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)(l )(F). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a)(2)(B). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b )(2)(0). 
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CAPT A mandates that a state plan submitted pursuant to its requirements be 
coordinated with the state's plan submitted under Title IV-B of the Social Security 
Act, which seeks to preserve families in which child abuse or neglect have been found 
to exist and to prevent children from entering the foster care system. 29 Thus, when 
taken together with Titles IV-B and IV-E, CAPTA attempts to provide a compre-
hensive funding scheme to respond to reports of child maltreatment. 
§ 10.3.2 Titles IV-Band IV-E 
By the late 1970s, in part as a result of heightened awareness of child maltreatment 
and mandated reporting, the number of children in the foster care system nationally 
had grown to more than a quarter of a million. Throughout the decade of the 1970s 
child advocates grew increasingly concerned about the number of children in foster 
care and the length of time those children spent in the foster care system. At that time, 
children who entered foster care often spent years in the legal "limbo" of the system, 
which was intended to provide temporary care for the children, not returning to their 
parents yet never being freed for adoption. The facts in two United States Supreme 
Court cases from that era provide vivid and typical examples of this problem. In Smith 
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equity and Reform (OFFER/0 foster parents 
brought suit alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when state child 
welfare workers moved foster children who had been in their care for extended 
periods of time, sometimes for years, without adequate due process. In its opinion, the 
Court noted that, on average, children in New York's foster care system stayed in 
temporary foster care for more than four years, with some children having lived with 
their foster parents for 10 years.31 Similarly, the oft cited Santosky> v Kramer,32 in 
which the court established the constitutionally mandated standard for termination of 
parental rights as clear and convincing, involved three children. One child entered 
foster care in November 1973, the other two in September 1974. In September 1976, 
the state sought to terminate parental rights. The court, however, denied the state's 
request. The children remained in foster care until October 1978 before the state again 
sought to free the children for adoption.33 
In addition to the problem of foster care "limbo," there was concern about "foster 
care drift," the phenomenon of children being moved from one placement to another, 
often repeatedly. For instance, in Smith v OFFER34 the court pointed out that in 1973-
29 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. 
30 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
31 Id. at 836. 
32 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
33 Of course, the Supreme Court did not issue its opinion in the case until March 1982, so the final 
resolution of the children's legal status took more than eight-and-one-half years. 
34 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
203 
Child Welfare Law and Practice 
197 4 approximately 80% of child who were removed after spending at least one year 
in a foster home were removed to be placed in another foster home.35 
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 
Concern about the numbers of children entering the foster care system, as well as 
the length of time they remained subject to placement instability, led Congress to pass 
and President Jimmy Carter to sign into law the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), which established Titles IV-B and IV-E of the 
Social Security Act. 36 The act's overarching goal was to reduce the number of 
children entering foster care and to reduce the length of time they remained in the 
system after they entered. Broadly speaking, the legislation addressed the problem in 
three ways. First, it sought to reduce the number of children entering foster care by 
requiring that "reasonable efforts" be made to keep children in their families. Next, 
the statute attempted to reduce children's lengths of stay by mandating that 
"reasonable efforts" be made to reunify children with their parents. 37 The statute also 
introduced for the first time the idea of permanency planning. Specifically, the law 
mandated that either the state child welfare agency or the court hold periodic reviews 
of cases to monitor progress (at least every six months) and that a permanency 
planning hearing be held after the child was in out-of-home care for 18 months. 
Finally, the legislation provided, for the first time, federally funded adoption subsidies 
in an effort to move special needs children-older children and those with emotional 
or behavioral problems-from the temporary status of foster care into permanent 
homes. 
Like CAPT A, the legislation sought to accomplish its goals by establishing a 
program of contingent funding for the states. If states developed child welfare and 
foster care programming consistent with the federal government's requirements, the 
state would be eligible to receive federal funding to support those efforts. Typically, 
the funds provided by the federal government require a state match, which varies from 
25% to 80% depending on the nature of the expenditure. 38 
35 Id. at 829, n. 23. While there has been some improvement in placement instability, it remains a 
substantial problem. For instance, a 2004 study conducted by the Children and Family Research 
Center at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign found that 40% of Illinois' foster children 
experience placement instability, which was defined as having at least four placements while in foster 
care. See Children and Family Research Center, Multiple Placements in Foster Care: Literature 
Review of Correlates and Predictors (2004 ), available at www.cfrc.illinois.edu/LRpdfs/Placement 
Stability. LR. pdf. 
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 670 et seq. 
37 The AACW A did not define "reasonable efforts," nor have subsequent amendments to the statute. For 
helpful guidance in understanding the reasonable efforts concept and its application in practice, see 
ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, MAKING SENSE OF THE ASF A REGULATIONS: A ROADMAP 
FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION (2001 ); CECILIA FIERMONTE & JENNIFER RENNE, ABA CENTER ON 
CHILDREN AND THE LAW, MAKING IT PERMANENT: REASONABLE EFFORTS TO FINALIZE PERMANENCY 
PLANS FOR FOSTER CHILDREN (2002). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 674 (detailing percentages ofreimbursements on expenditures). 
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Federal funds available pursuant to Title IV-Bare intended for use in preventing 
and responding to cases of child maltreatment. Its purposes are broadly outlined in the 
statute: 
The purpose of [Title IV-B] is to promote State flexibility in the 
development and expansion of a coordinated child and family 
services program that utilizes community-based agencies and ensures 
all children are raised in safe, loving families, by-
( 1) protecting and promoting the welfare of all children; 
(2) preventing the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children; 
(3) supporting at-risk families through services which allow 
children, where appropriate, to remain safely with their families 
or return to their families in a timely manner; 
( 4) promoting the safety, permanence, and well-being of children in 
foster care and adoptive families; and 
(5) providing training, professional development and support to 
ensure a well-qualified child welfare workforce.39 
In order to be eligible to draw down the federal money, the state, together with the 
Secretary of DHHS, must develop a state plan for the provision of child welfare 
services that meets certain federal requirements.40 The statute requires that the state's 
Title IV-B plan be coordinated with the state's other child welfare plans pursuant to 
various other federal child welfare legislation.41 The state's child welfare agency must 
also "demonstrate substantial, ongoing, and meaningful collaboration with state 
courts" in implementing their plans.42 
Title IV-E funds provide federal assistance to states to help offset the costs of 
placing abused and neglected children into the foster care system when they cannot be 
safely maintained in their homes. It has long required states to develop a plan for the 
delivery of child welfare services, which must be approved by the federal govern-
ment. Among its many requirements are that each child that enters foster care must 
have a plan that articulates the permanency goal for the child, establishes a schedule 
of services that the parents and child are to receive to facilitate reunification or, if 
reunification is not the permanency goal, a plan for achieving the identified permanent 
goal. 
The AACW A began to have its intended impact. By 1982 the number of children 
in foster care began to decline.43 But two phenomena converged shortly thereafter to 
39 42 U.S.C. § 621. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 622. 
41 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(2). 
42 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(13). 
43 RICHARD GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN THEIR LIVES 
130--31 (1996). 
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dramatically increase the number of children entering the nation's foster care system. 
First, in response to the election of Ronald Reagan as President, a more conservative 
government began to cut economic benefits to poor and working families. Between 
1982 and 1984 nearly a half million families were removed from public assistance 
and another half million lost their Social Security disability payments.44 Secondly, 
new social forces emerged--<:rack cocaine and HIV I AIDS-that dramatically 
increased the demand for child welfare services, and professionals began to see more 
families with multiple problems.45 Whereas in 1982 there were about a quarter of a 
million children in the nation's foster care system, by 1993 that number had grown to 
464,000.46 
One response to the increased demand for child welfare services through the 
decade of the 1980s that was consistent with the federal mandate of the AACW A to 
preserve families was the increased use of family preservation programs. In hindsight, 
these politically popular programs may have been utilized beyond what the evidence 
of their efficacy would support.47 As Professor Elizabeth Bartholet has observed, 
advocates for these programs often measured their success by whether they 
maintained children in their homes rather than whether children were safe and well 
cared for. 48 In a number of high profile cases, children were seriously injured or killed 
by parents in families in which child protective services had been involved.49 This led 
policy makers to act once again. 
Adoption and Safe Families Act 
Concerned that its intent with regard to the handling of child welfare cases-and 
especially that its intentions regarding the application of the "reasonable efforts" and 
family preservation provisions of the AACW A-had been misunderstood and 
misapplied,5° Congress, in 1997, passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), 
which became law in November of that year.5' ASFA amended Titles IV-Band IV-E 
to clarify the intent of Congress with regard to the provision of child welfare services. 
ASF A maintained the basic formula established in the AACW A. First, it 
reaffirmed the federal government's commitment to family preservation as a means of 
reducing the number of children removed from their homes and placed into the foster 
care system. It maintained the requirement that in most cases state child welfare 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 131-32. 
46 Id. at 131. 
47 
Id. at 132-33; see also ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE, NEGLECT, FOSTER 
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (J 999). 
48 Id. at 113-121. 
49 See, e.g., RICHARD GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN 
THEIR LIVES ( 1996). 
50 Id. (arguing that family preservation had become the "central mission" of the child welfare system 
and that it placed children at unacceptable risk of harm). 
51 Pub. L. No. I 05-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (as codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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agencies should make "reasonable efforts" to maintain familial integrity, and it 
substantially increased the funding available to states for family preservation services. 
In doing so, however, the Congress specifically sought to make clear that "in deter-
mining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child ... the child's health and 
safety shall be the paramount concern. "52 
Next, when a child's safety in the familial home cannot be guaranteed, ASFA 
provides for a differential response depending on the nature of the harm done to the 
child. In cases of serious abuse in which the child or a sibling of the child has suffered 
grave harm, that has resulted in a criminal conviction of the parent for killing or 
inflicting serious harm on a child or where a parent has experienced previous 
involuntary termination of parental rights, ASF A eliminates the reasonable efforts 
requirement altogether and requires that the state child welfare agency immediately 
initiate or join an effort to terminate the parent's rights or otherwise place the child 
permanently.53 Thus, for the first time, the federal law demanded that states seek 
immediate termination of parental rights or that another alternative permanent plan be 
sought in order to protect the child from abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 
ASF A also invited, but did not require, each state to establish for itself a set of 
"aggravated circumstances" cases, which the state determines by either statute or 
policy will render a parent ineligible for either family preservation or family reunifi-
cation services. 54 That is, ASF A permitted each state to define for itself a category of 
cases in which it will immediately seek to terminate the parents' rights or implement 
an alternative permanency plan. While the federal legislation allows each state to 
determine the specific types of cases that will fall within the "aggravated circum-
stances" designation, it suggests that appropriate cases may include situations where 
the parent has subjected the child to "abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual 
abuse."55 Finally, ASF A permits the state child welfare agency to seek,56 and the court 
to grant,57 a request for immediate or early termination of parental rights in any case 
52 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l5). 
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l5)(D)(ii). See also 45 C.F.R. § 1356.2l(b)(3) (requiring that the parent be 
convicted of the relevant crime before ASFA's mandatory termination requirement is triggered). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(15)(D)(i). 
55 Id. Note, again, that this list is merely suggestive and that each state is free to determine for itself 
whether or not to include these or other types of cases in its definition of"aggravated circumstances" 
cases. For example, Michigan has adopted a definition of"aggravated circumstances" cases that 
includes child sexual abuse involving penetration or an attempt to penetrate, but has excluded those 
sexual abuse cases which involve only fondling. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 722.638 (requiring 
state child protection agency to petition the court and seek termination of parental rights at the initial 
dispositional hearing); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A. l 9b(3)(k) (establishing aggravated circum-
stances as a basis for termination of parental rights). For more information regarding the bases for 
involuntary termination of parental rights, including information as to how individual states have 
defined "aggravated circumstances," see the following page on the Children's Bureau's Child Welfare 
Information Gateway: http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws _policies/statutes/reunify.cfm#4. 
56 
See Rule of Construction following 42 U.S.C. § 675 (Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(d)); see generally 
U.S. v Weldon, 377 U.S. 95, n. 4 (1964). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 678. 
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where the facts and circumstances of that particular child's situation warrant such 
action. Illinois has, for instance, adopted a statute that codifies this authority. Its law 
permits an appropriate party to seek termination of parental rights "in those extreme 
cases in which the parent's incapacity to care for the child, combined with an 
extremely poor prognosis for treatment or rehabilitation, justifies expedited 
termination of parental rights."58 Statutes such as this may place an additional burden 
on the child's attorney. For instance, some states allow the child's advocate to petition 
the court to terminate parental rights or to otherwise move to permanency at any time 
after the case is filed. In a state that permits such action, it is a good practice for the 
child's advocate to consider at each stage of every case whether the facts merit an 
effort to pursue early permanency or whether continued efforts to reunify the family 
will best serve the child. 
Unless the court has determined that no "reasonable efforts" are required and 
permits a party to immediately implement an alternative permanent plan, the state 
must make "reasonable efforts" to reunify the child with his or her parent. While the 
federal law requires "reasonable efforts" be made in most cases, it does not define 
what constitutes "reasonable efforts." Defining "reasonable efforts" in a way that is 
truly helpful and provides practitioners with guidance has proven elusive. Missouri, 
for example, uses this definition: 
"Reasonable efforts" means the exercise of reasonable diligence and 
care ... to utilize all available services related to meeting the needs of 
the juvenile and the family. In determining reasonable efforts to be 
made and in making such reasonable efforts, the child's present and 
ongoing health and safety shall be the paramount consideration.59 
In order to operationalize the definition, some states have combined a definition 
of "reasonable efforts" with criteria to help courts determine whether the state agency 
has undertaken the necessary steps to comply with the requirement. The Iowa statute 
provides an example of this approach: 
"reasonable efforts" means the efforts made to preserve and unify a 
family prior to the out-of-home placement of a child in foster care or 
to eliminate the need for removal of the child or make it possible for 
the child to safely return to the family's home. Reasonable efforts 
shall include but are not limited to giving consideration, if 
appropriate, to interstate placement of a child in the permanency 
planning decisions involving the child and giving consideration to in-
state and out-of-state placement options at a permanency hearing and 
when using concurrent planning. If returning the child to the family's 
home is not appropriate or not possible, reasonable efforts shall 
58 See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.§ 405/1-2(l)(c). 
59 Mo. ANN. REv. STAT. § 211.183(2). 
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include the efforts made in a timely manner to finalize a permanency 
plan for the child. A child's health and safety shall be the paramount 
concern in making reasonable efforts. Reasonable efforts may include 
but are not limited to family-centered services, if the child's safety in 
the home can be maintained during the time the services are provided. 
In determining whether reasonable efforts have been made, the court 
shall consider both of the following: 
( 1) The type, duration, and intensity of services or support offered 
or provided to the child and the child's family. If family-
centered services were not provided, the court record shall 
enumerate the reasons the services were not provided, including 
but not limited to whether the services were not available, not 
accepted by the child's family, judged to be unable to protect 
the child and the child's family during the time the services 
would have been provided, judged to be unlikely to be 
successful in resolving the problems which would lead to 
removal of the child, or other services were found to be more 
appropriate. 
(2) The relative risk to the child of remaining in the child's home 
versus removal of the child. 60 
Despite the definitional difficulties, when "reasonable efforts" must be made the 
state's child welfare agency must establish a written case plan. That plan must include 
a description of the child's placement and a schedule of services to be provided to the 
child, the child's parents, and the foster parents to facilitate reunification.61 
Additionally, the plan must contain information about the child's health care, 
schooling, and related information.62 If the child is 16 years of age or older, the case 
plan typically must contain a schedule of services aimed at helping the youth develop 
independence.63 If the permanency planning goal is adoption or some other alternative 
(e.g., permanent guardianship), then the case plan must include a description of the 
"reasonable efforts" made to achieve the identified goal.64 
In addition to the provisions that more clearly define the need to make 
"reasonable efforts,'' ASF A made numerous procedural changes aimed at expediting 
children's moves through the foster care system.65 The state's plan for providing 
60 
IOWA CODE § 232.102(1 O)(a). 
61 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (defining "case plan" and detailing the contents of that plan). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 675(1). 
63 See§ 10.5, The Foster Care Independence Act (Chaffee Act). It should be noted that some states have 
made these independent living skills programs and services available to youth younger than 16. You 
should consult your state laws and policy to determine your state's approach to this question. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(E). 
65 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). 
209 
Child Welfare Law and Practice 
foster care services must include a "case review system" that provides for periodic 
review of the case by a court or an administrative agency at least every six months, as 
well as a permanency planning hearing to be held at least once every 12 months for as 
long as the child remains in foster care.66 Subject to several specific exceptions, when 
a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, ASF A requires 
that the state child welfare agency pursue termination of parental rights.67 At least one 
state's supreme court has held, however, that more than the mere passage of time is 
necessary when considering termination based on the child's being in foster care for a 
defined period of time.68 
Several other provisions of ASF A focused on expediting children's moves 
through foster care. ASFA continued AACWA's effort to move children out of the 
foster care system and into permanent placement by permitting the use of concurrent 
planning.69 Concurrent planning allows the state to simultaneously pursue efforts 
aimed at reunification as well as efforts to place the child in an alternative permanent 
setting if family reunification cannot be achieved. Such a concurrent approach, as 
opposed to the seriatim approach often used by child welfare agencies, may shorten 
substantially the child's stay in temporary foster care. 
Next, in addition to continuing the subsidies available to individual families to 
assist with expenses associated with adoption, ASF A provided each state a financial 
incentive to focus on efforts to move children who could not be returned to their 
family of origin into adoptive homes. It did so by establishing a baseline number of 
adoptions and then paying the state a bonus for each adoption from foster care 
finalized in excess of that baseline. 70 
Finally, the ASF A expanded the permanency options available for resolving 
cases.71 For instance, permanent guardianship was specifically recognized as a form 
of permanency.72 As a last resort for those children who could not be returned to their 
family of origin but for whom more complete legal permanency could not be achieved, 
ASF A permitted the state to use "another planned permanent living arrangement" 
(APPLA).73 APPLA "is a case plan designation for children in out-of-home care for 
66 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
68 In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 2001) (termination based merely on child's placement in foster care 
for 15 of22 months violated parent's substantive due process right to custody of the child). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l5)(F). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 673b. 
71 
See generally DONALD N. DUQUETTE & MARK HARDIN, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE 
LEGISLATION GoVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN (Children's Bureau 1999). 
72 
42 U.S.C. § 675(7) (defining "legal guardianship" as a judicially created relationship that is intended 
to be permanent). It should be noted here that additional amendments to Title IV-E enacted as part of 
the Fostering Connections Act have further ensconced legal guardianship as a permanency plan and 
provides federal funding to assist in the establishment of permanent, subsidized legal guardianships. 
These changes are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C). 
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whom there is no goal for placement with a legal, permanent family. "74 Before using 
an APPLA, the caseworker must document and present to the court compelling 
reasons why a more appropriate, legally permanent placement option (e.g., return 
home, adoption, permanent placement with a willing relative) is not available for the 
child or youth.75 APPLA may include independent living for an older foster youth 
who does not wish to be adopted, long-term foster care placement for a youth who has 
a strong bond with his or her natural parent but whose parent is unable to care for the 
youth or, in the case of an Indian child, a situation where the child's tribe has 
established a different plan for the child's permanent placement.76 
§ 10.4 Multiethnic Placement Act and the lnterethnic 
Adoption Provisions 
§ 10.4.1 History 
Through much of American history, minority children-and particularly African 
American children-were excluded from receiving publicly funded child welfare 
services or received fewer services in less family-like settings than Caucasian 
children. 77 Some non-governmental child welfare programs provided services to 
children without regard to race, yet the needs of children of color often went unmet or 
were improperly addressed.78 In the early decades of the twentieth century, African 
American women began establishing privately funded programs to provide services 
for Black children in need of such services.79 Over time, these organizations 
contracted with public authorities to provide services to children of color. Today it 
would be illegal to deny a child services to a child or family based on race. 
In recent years, the concern of child welfare professionals has not been the lack of 
services to children of color,80 but rather the overrepresentation of minority children, 
74 Child Welfare Information Gateway, APPLA and LTFC, available at www.childwelfare.gov/out of 
home/types/appla _Itfc.cfm. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). 
76 See Jennifer Renne & Gerald P. Mallon, Facilitating Permanency for Youth: The Overuse of Long-
Term Foster Care and the Appropriate Use of Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement as 
Options for Youth in Foster Care, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF 
PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg Mccartt Hess eds., 2005). 
77 Wilma Peebles-Wilkins, Janie Porter Barrett and the Virginia Industrial Schoo/for Colored Girls: 
Community Response to the Needs of African American Children, 74/l CHILD WELFARE 143 (1995); 
JOHN E. B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: p AST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 184--85 (2006). See 
generally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 
(2003). 
1s Id. 
79 Wilma Peebles-Wilkins, Janie Porter Barrett and the Virginia Industrial School for Colored Girls: 
Community Response to the Needs of African American Children, 74/l CHILD WELFARE 143, 145--46 
(1995). 
80 
A number of commentators have argued, of course, that children and families of color are provided 
the wrong or inadequate services. See JOHN E. B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, 
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and particularly African American children, in the nation's public child welfare 
system.81 As African American children began to be served by the public system, a 
number of controversies emerged. Among these, few have been more contentious 
than the placement of children across racial lines, principally, although not exclu-
sively, the placement of African American children with Caucasian families.82 On the 
one hand, the failure to place children across racial lines means that there is a smaller 
foster family pool to draw from, and this may deprive children of a family and 
condemn them to shuffle from temporary foster home to temporary foster home or 
institutional care.83 On the other hand, there is concern that placing children across 
racial lines may dislocate children from their racial and ethnic identity and will not 
adequately prepare minority children for dealing with a racist society.84 
Placement of children across racial lines for foster care and adoption has had a 
contentious history in this country.85 This may in part stem from a long-standing 
misperception that African Americans families were unwilling to adopt. 86 But it also 
has its roots in the historical failure of public authorities to license African American 
homes to provide foster care to children, sometimes because of overt racism and 
sometimes because of the application of race neutral licensing criteria, which 
historically have had a disproportionate negative impact on African Americans. In 
1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers adopted a policy position 
opposing the adoption of African-American children by non-African-American 
parents.87 While over the years the organization's position has developed nuance, it 
continues to oppose the trans-racial adoption of African-American children in most 
circurnstances.88 For decades, child welfare agencies maintained race matching 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 185 (2006) (citing DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF 
CHILD WELFARE (2002)). 
81 JOHN E. B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 198 (2006). 
82 The removal Indian children from their families and placement with White families for adoption was 
a major impetus for the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. For a 
full discussion of the reasons for the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act, see§ 12.2, History. 
83 See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND 
ADOPTION 402-79 (2003). 
84 Id. at 395-96. 
85 See generally Id. (discussing the conflict surrounding interracial adoption); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, 
NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE, NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 123-40 
(1999) (discussing the history of the controversy surrounding race matching in adoption). 
86 ANDREW BILLINGSLEY, CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
FAMILIES 29 (1992). 
87 See National Association of Black Social Workers, Preserving Families of African Ancestry (adopted 
by the NABSW National Steering Committee, Jan. 10, 1993), available at www.nabsw.org/mserver/ 
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policies for foster children and those in need of adoption services. 89 During that time, 
placement of a child across racial lines was permitted only as a last resort. 90 Too 
frequently, however, children were removed from stable trans-racial foster home 
placements only to prevent the possibility of a trans-racial adoption. 91 Those polices 
often resulted in minority children remaining in temporary foster care for unneces-
sarily long periods of time.92 
In an effort to address these issues, Congress passed the Multi-Ethnic Placement 
Act (MEPA) in 1994, which amended portions of Title IV-Band IV-E of the Social 
Security Act.93 The Act sought to eliminate--or at least dramatically reduce-race, 
color, and national origin as considerations in making foster care and adoptive 
placement decisions. The original statute, however, contained language that was 
easily interpreted to permit just what it intended to prohibit-the consideration of 
race, color, or national origin of the child or the parent when making foster care or 
adoptive placement decisions.94 For example, the statute prohibited the "routine" 
consideration of race, color, or national when making placement decisions, which 
implied that these factors were legitimate considerations rather than wholly 
prohibited. 
Two years after the enactment of MEP A, Congress enacted the Interethnic 
Adoption Provisions of the Small Business Job Protection Act (IEP). These amend-
ments sought to clarify Congress's intent that, consistent with other civil rights 
legislation, considerations of race, color, or national origin were not to be permitted 
when making placement decisions in the public child welfare system.95 The IEP also 
engrafted significant financial penalties in the form of loss of Title IV-E funding onto 
the law for violation of its terms. 96 Moreover, the amendments explicitly provided a 
right to sue to any child or adult aggrieved by its violation.97 
Broadly speaking, the MEPA-IEP seeks to achieve three goals. First, it seeks to 
eliminate the consideration of a person's race, color, or national origin with regard to 
licensing foster parents. The current law provides that: 
89 
JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLNGER & THE ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A GUIDE TO THE 
MUL TIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT OF 1994 AS AMENDED BY THE INTERETHNIC ADOPTION PROVISIONS OF 
1996 at 4-6 (American Bar Association 1998). 
90 Id. at 4. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 5. 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(7); 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l8); 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(2). 
94 
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE, NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION 
ALTERNATIVE 130-31 (1999). 
95 Id. at 131. 
96 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(l). 
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(3). 
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... neither the State nor any other entity in the State that receives 
funds from the Federal Government and is involved in adoption or 
foster care placements may-
( A) deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a 
foster parent, on the basis of race, color, or national origin of the 
person, or of the child, involved.98 
Next, it prohibits state child welfare agencies, their workers or agents, and the 
courts from considering the race, color, or national origin of either a child or a parent 
when making decisions regarding foster care or adoptive placement of a child. The 
law provides that state agencies or their agents shall not "delay or deny the placement 
of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of the race, color, or national 
origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved. "99 
Finally, it requires state child welfare authorities to make diligent efforts to recruit 
foster and adoptive parents "that reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of children in 
the State for whom foster and adoptive homes are needed."100 Specifically, the law, as 
interpreted by the Department of Health and Human Services, mandates that, among 
other things, state authorities do all of the following: 
• Develop recruitment plans that reach all parts of the community 
• Use diverse methods and avenues for disseminating information about 
fostering and adopting 
• Ensure all prospective foster or adoptive parents have timely access to the 
home study process 
• Train workers to work with diverse cultures 
• Develop methods to overcome language barriers 101 
§ 10.4.2 Delay 
Any delay in placement based on race, color, or national origin is prohibited by 
the statute. Thus, for instance, using "holding periods" for the purpose of placing a 
child in racially congruent foster or adoptive home would violate the law. 
98 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l8)(A). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l8)(B). 
IOO 42 u.s.c. § 622(b )(7); see also JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLNGER & THE ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE 
LAW, A GUIDE TO THE MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT OF 1994 AS AMENDED BY THE lNTERETHNIC 
ADOPTION PROVISIONS OF 1996 at 2 (American Bar Association 1998). 
IOI JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLNGER & THE ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A GUIDE TO THE 
MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT OF 1994 AS AMENDED BY THE INTERETHNIC ADOPTION PROVISIONS OF 
1996 at 13 (American Bar Association 1998). 
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§ 10.4.3 Denial 
Under MEPA-IEP, race, color, or national origin cannot be used to render a child 
ineligible for foster care or adoption or to deny a person the opportunity to become a 
foster parent. Additionally, the agency must not take race, color, or national origin 
into consideration when making decisions regarding efforts aimed at reunification, 
concurrent planning, or the termination of parental rights. 
Although race, color, and national origin may not be considerations used to deny 
foster care or adoptive placement, MEPA-IEP does not prohibit all consideration of 
these factors when assessing the needs of a particular child in an individual case. 102 
Guidance published by the DHHS in 1997 and 1998 provides that in certain, narrowly 
tailored situations, the best interests of a particular child may support some 
consideration of race, color, or national origin in placement decision-making. 103 To be 
legitimate, however, consideration of these factors must grow out of the unique needs 
of a particular child. The 1997 policy guidance provides insight into the types of 
consideration which may be permissible: 
[I]t is conceivable that an older child or adolescent might express an 
unwillingness to be placed with a family of a particular race. In some 
states older children and adolescents must consent to their adoption 
by a particular family. In such an individual situation, an agency is 
not required to dismiss the child's express unwillingness to consent in 
evaluating placements. 104 
In very carefully circumscribed instances such as these, consideration of race, 
color, or national origin may be appropriate under the law. Even in situations such as 
these, however, the caseworker should not blindly defer to the young person. Rather, 
this should be seen as a situation in which the child may need counseling. Agencies' 
actions in such cases will be carefully scrutinized to ensure that there are not more 
narrowly tailored responses available to meet the child's expressed reluctance. 
When a child has a specific need relating to race, color, or national origin, that 
need as well as less impactful methods of addressing the child's need should be 
carefully documented in the child's case file. Doing so will help prevent the routine 
consideration of race, color, or national origin that the law so clearly prohibits. Race, 
color, or national origin, then, should only rarely be taken into consideration when 
making placement decisions. 
Two important issues must be accounted for when race, color, or national origin 
influence a placement decision. First, race, color, or national origin cannot be con-
sidered for certain categories of children. For instance, infants are presumed to have 
102 
See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, 
Guidance for Federal Legislation-The Small Business and Job Protection Act of 1996 (IM-97-04) 
(June 5, 1997). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 4. 
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no special needs concerning race, color, or national origin. As such, consideration of 
race, color, or national origin during placement decision-making for an infant cannot 
grow out of the unique needs of the individual child, and any consideration of them 
when making decisions regarding infants is prohibited. Secondly, any consideration of 
race, color, or national origin will be subjected to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. Thus, even in a situation where 
race, color, or national origin may be properly considered, the agency's response must 
not be overly broad and the agency must seek out the least restrictive means of 
addressing the individualized needs of the specific child. Responses to a child's 
individualized needs regarding race, color, or national origin must be narrowly 
tailored to meet that specifically articulated need. 
§ 10.4.4 MEPA-IEP and the Indian Child Welfare Act 
MEPA-IEP specifically provides that its provisions do not apply to any child who 
qualifies as an "Indian child" under the ICW A. 105 Because ICW A applies only to 
children who are members of or eligible for membership in a federally recognized 
Indian tribe (i.e., one who meets the definition of "Indian child"), MEPA-IEP's 
provisions would apply to those children who are of Native American heritage but 
who are not member of or eligible for membership in a tribe. 
§ 10.4.5 Enforcement 
MEPA-IEP contains strict enforcement mechanisms. First, violations of the 
MEPA-IEP's requirements may constitute a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 106 Next, failure to comply with the statute's mandates may result in 
substantial financial penalties for the state in the form of lost Title N-B funding. 107 
Similarly, a state may lose Title N-E funds if it violates the statute. 108 Specifically, 
the statute provides for a penalty of a 2-percent reduction in the state's Title IV-E 
funds for the fiscal year for a first violation, a 3-percent reduction for a second 
violation, and a 5-percent reduction for the third violation. These penalties could 
easily run into the tens of millions of dollars. Finally, the statute explicitly provides an 
individual cause of action for any individual child or prospective foster or adoptive 
parent who has been aggrieved as a result of a violation of the statute. 109 MEPA-IEP 
provides a two-year statute of limitations for bringing an action. 110 
IOS 42 u.s.c. § 674(d)(4); 42 u.s.c. § 1996b(3). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(2); see also JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLNGER & THE ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE 
LAW, A GUIDE TO THE MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT OF 1994 AS AMENDED BY THE INTERETHNIC 
ADOPTION PROVISIONS OF 1996 at 16 (American Bar Association 1998). 
107 42 U.S.C. § 623(a); 45 C.F.R. § 201.6(a). 
108 42 U.S.C. § 674(d). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(3). 
110 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(3). 
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§ 10.5 The Foster Care Independence Act 
(Chaffee Act) 
Although discussed in more detail in Chapter 23, the Foster Care Independence 
Act (commonly referred to as the Chaffee Act) merits a brief mention here. For some 
time it has been clear that youth who age out of the foster care system without having 
found a stable family face major obstacles in their transition to young adulthood.111 
Among the challenges these young people face are lack of adequate education, lack of 
marketable job skills, homelessness, poverty, teen pregnancy, and involvement in the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems. To address these problems, in 1986 Congress 
amended Title IV-E to establish the Independent Living Program. The Program aims 
to provide services to older foster youth to prepare them for adulthood. In 1999 
Congress expanded the services available to these youth by amending various 
provisions of Title IV-E. Basically, the Chaffee Act established the Chaffee Foster 
Care Independence Program, which allowed states to provide Medicaid coverage to 
youth 18 to 21 years of age who are in foster care on their 18th birthday, permitted 
foster care youth to have assets valued at up to $10,000 and remain eligible for Title 
IV-E funding (up from only $1000), required state child welfare authorities to ensure 
that foster parents are prepared initially and on an ongoing basis to care for the youth 
placed in their homes, and authorized increased adoption incentive payments to states 
to aide in establishing permanent homes for these youth. 
§ 10.6 Fostering Connections to Success and 
Increasing Adoptions Act 
The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act (Fostering 
Connections Act), 112 which amends numerous provisions of Titles IV-B and IV-E, 
became law on October 7, 2008. In broad terms, these amendments seek to maintain a 
child's ties with family, expedite children's passage through the foster care system, 
provide prompt permanency, and achieve better outcomes for youth once they leave 
the foster care system. More specifically, the Fostering Connections Act: (1) expands 
permanency options for foster children and youth; (2) requires increased efforts of 
state child welfare authorities to locate members of a child's kinship network where 
that child is in or at risk of entering the child welfare system; (3) requires state child 
welfare authorities to undertake more aggressive efforts to notify a child's adult 
relatives that the child has entered the foster care system; (4) permits waiver of certain 
foster home licensing rules in order to place a child with relatives; (5) permits states 
to maintain youth in foster care until age 21 under certain circumstances; (6) requires 
that the agency work with youth close to aging out of foster care to develop a plan for 
111 MARTHA SHIRK & GARY STRANGLER, ON THEIR OWN: WHAT HAPPENS TO Krns WHEN THEY AGE Our 
OF THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM? (Westview Press 2004). 
112 42 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 670 et seq. 
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transitioning to independence; (7) encourages educational stability by requiring state 
child welfare authorities to coordinate with educational providers; (8) ensures children 
in foster care have access to health care; (9) ensures that when possible siblings are 
placed together; (10) permits Indian tribes to directly access Title IV-E funds rather 
than having to work through states to receive these funds; (11) provides incentives for 
adoption of children from the foster care system. Each of these goals will be discussed 
briefly. 
§ 10.6.1 Expanded Permanency Options 
The Fostering Connections Act permits each state to establish a subsidized kinship 
guardianship program. Under such a program "grandparents and other relatives" who 
have cared for a child in the role of foster parents and who are willing to make a 
permanent commitment to raising the child may become legal guardians of the child. 
This program would work much the same way as the adoption assistance program. 
The adult relative would be given guardianship over the foster child that is intended to 
be permanent. The relative-guardian would receive financial assistance to provide 
care for that child. Among other requirements, to be eligible for a subsidized 
guardianship, the relative must have cared for the child as a foster care provider for 
six consecutive months. Additionally, the state can be reimbursed by the federal 
government for up to $2000 per child for nonrecurring expenses related to getting the 
guardianship put in place (e.g., filing fees). Before a relative-guardian may receive 
kinship guardianship assistance payments, the agency must conduct a criminal 
background check using national crime information data bases of the guardian and 
any other adult living in the home. Moreover, before placing a child in a kinship 
guardianship, the case worker must document the steps that were taken to determine 
that returning the child to the parent is not an appropriate permanency plan, why 
placement with a relative in a permanent guardianship will serve the child's best 
interests, that adoption by the relative has been discussed and why adoption is not 
being pursued, and what efforts were made to discuss the matter with the child's 
parents. 
§ 10.6.2 Locating Adult Relatives 
The amendments permit the DHHS to make a limited number of matching grants 
to the individual states, local, tribal, or private agencies to help children who are in or 
are at risk of entering the foster care system to reconnect with adult relatives. Among 
the services that may be made available through these grants are kinship navigator 
programs, which assist adult caregivers in locating services that will assist them in 
providing for the needs of a child who is placed with them. Included in the bundle of 
services that should be made available through the kinship navigator program is 
assistance in locating and obtaining legal counsel. 
These grants may also be used to implement "intensive family-finding efforts" to 
locate members of the child's extended family, to work toward reestablishment of 
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relationships with these newly located relatives, and to find permanent family 
placements for children. 
Family connection grants may also be used to fund "residential family treatment" 
programs that would "enable parents and their children to live in a safe environment 
for a period of not less than 6 months" and which would provide various services to 
the child and the parent, either in that program or by way of referral to another 
program. 113 
§ 10.6.3 Providing Notice to Relatives 
The Fostering Connections Act amends Title N-E to require that each state's plan 
provide that within 30 days of the child's removal from the parental home state 
authorities will "exercise due diligence to identify and provide notice to all adult 
grandparents and other adult relatives of the child" unless there has been family or 
domestic violence involving that adult. 114 The statute contains a number of 
requirements for the information that must be provided in such a notification. 
§ 10.6.4 Waiving Licensing Rules 
The statute clarifies that non-safety related licensing rules may be waived to 
facilitate placement of children into relative foster homes. 115 However, such waivers 
must be made on a case-by-case basis and may not be made as a matter of policy. 
Each state may define for itself what constitutes a "non-safety" licensing rule. 
§ 10.6.5 Extending Age of Foster Care Placement 
While it is the federal government's general policy to move children out of the 
foster care system and into permanent placements as soon as possible, for older youth, 
remaining in the foster care system longer may actually enhance the young person's 
chances of a successful transition into adulthood. 116 For instance, in a study 
comparing the outcomes of youth who were released from the foster care system at 18 
and those who were maintained in the system until age 21, researchers at Chapin Hall 
found evidence that youth maintained in the system until age 21 had improved 
outcomes in terms of education, earnings from employment, and delayed teen 
pregnancy. 117 In part as a result of this research, effective October 1, 2010, the Act 
113 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(4). 
114 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(29). 
115 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l0). 
116 For a summary of this research, see Mark E. Courtney, Amy Dworsky & Harold Pollack, Issue Brief 
When Should the State Cease Parenting? Evidence.from the Midwest Study (Chapin Hall Center for 
Children, Dec. 2007). For a more detailed discussion of this research, see Mark E. Courtney, A. 
Dworsky, G. R. Cusick, J. Havlicek, A. Perez & T. Keller, Midwest Evaluation of Adult Functioning 
of Former Foster Youth: Outcomes at Age 21 (Chapin Hall Center for Children 2007). 
117 
Mark E. Courtney, Amy Dworsky & Harold Pollack, Issue Brief When Should the State Cease 
Parenting? Evidence.from the Midwest Study (Chapin Hall Center for Children, Dec. 2007). 
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permits the federal government to provide funding to support youth if a state elects to 
extend their stays in the foster care system to the age of 21. To be eligible for Title 
IV-E funding between the ages of 18 and 21, the youth must be completing high 
school or an equivalent program, be enrolled in college or a program of vocational 
education, be engaged in a program to obtain employment, be employed for at least 
80 hours per month, or be unable to be involved in one of these programs because of a 
medical condition.118 
§ 10.6.6 Transition Plan 
The Fostering Connections amendments require that during the 90 days 
immediately preceding a youth's emancipation from foster care, whether at age 18 or 
older if the state chooses, agency caseworkers must meet with the youth and others 
who are supportive of the youth for the purpose of developing a transition plan for 
exiting the foster care system. 119 The plan must be "personalized at the direction of 
the child" and must specifically address the youth's housing, health insurance, 
education, available mentors, continuing support services that are available to the 
youth, work force supports, and employment services. The plan must be as detailed as 
the youth chooses. 
§ 10.6.7 Educational Stability 
Children entering the foster care system have often been required to move to a 
new school system. These moves have inevitably resulted in foster children losing 
momentum in their educational progress. The Fostering Connections Act seeks to 
address this problem by requiring that State child welfare authorities work with 
relevant educational authorities to ensure that children who are removed from the 
homes of their biological parents can remain in their elementary or secondary school 
after the move. 120 Thus, each state's plan for foster care must contain assurances that: 
(1) the appropriateness of the child's educational placement is taken into consider-
ation when making decisions about moving the child, and (2) foster placements, 
whenever possible, are coordinated to ensure the child can remain in his or her school 
if doing so is in the best interests of the child. Where remaining in the school in which 
the child was enrolled at the time of placement is not in the child's best interests, then 
the state plan must provide for the immediate placement of the child is an appropriate 
school setting. The federal government will also reimburse states for travel expenses 
associated with maintaining a child in his or her pre-placement school. 
118 42 U.S.C. § 675(8). 
119 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(H). 
120 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(G). 
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§ 10.6.8 Health Care 
Children entering the foster care system have numerous health care needs, 
sometimes due to naturally occurring maladies or due to the neglect and abuse they 
have experienced before entering the system. 121 There has been long-standing concern 
about the promptness, continuity, and quality of health care foster children receive 
while in care. Fostering Connections requires that states' plans for delivery of services 
to children in foster care include a strategy to ensure that children are provided 
appropriate health care, 122 including for mental and dental health. In addition to initial 
and periodic physical exams, the state may develop a plan for ensuring that the child's 
medical records are created and stored electronically and are accessible as health care 
providers may change. The state must also include in its plan for delivery of foster 
care services a plan to ensure continuity of medical care and the agency may establish 
a medical home for the child. 
§ 10.6.9 Keeping Siblings Together 
Fostering Connections establishes a preference that when removed from the home 
of their parents, siblings will be placed together. 123 Thus, it amends Title IV-E to 
require each state's plan for providing foster care services must include a commitment 
that the state will make "reasonable efforts" to place siblings together-whether in the 
home of a relative, foster home with an unrelated person, or for adoption-unless 
placing the children in the same home would not protect the safety and well-being of 
one or more of the children. When siblings cannot be placed in the same home, the 
agency must provide for "frequent visitation or other ongoing interaction between the 
siblings" unless such frequent contact would not serve the child's interests. 124 
§ 10.6.10 Tribal Access to Title IV-E Funds 
Historically Indian tribes have not had direct access to Title IV-E funds. To gain 
access to this money, tribes have been required to develop agreements with state child 
welfare authorities to draw down their share of these federal dollars. Only about half 
the federally recognized tribes have such an agreement in place. 125 The Fostering 
Connections Act attempts to change this by establishing a system that permits tribes 
or tribal consortiums to develop their own plans for providing child welfare services, 
thereby gaining direct access to federal financial assistance. 126 
121 See Jan McCarthy & Maria Woolverton, Healthcare Needs of Children and Youth in Foster Care, in 
CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 129-
47 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg Mccartt Hess eds., 2005). 
122 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(l5). 
123 42.U.S.C. § 67l(a). 
124 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(3l)(B). 
125 Visit the Fostering Connections Resource Center at www.fosteringconnections.org. 
126 42 U.S.C. § 679c. 
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To avail itself of this direct federal funding, the tribe or tribal consortium must 
develop a plan for delivery of child welfare services similar to the plans states have 
been required to have in place. Each such plan must ensure that it has the capacity to 
provide for adequate fiscal management of federal programs and must describe the 
service areas and the populations that will benefit from the tribe's child welfare 
services program. The law requires that the Secretary of DHHS provide technical 
assistance to tribes to assist them in developing a Title IV-E plan for the delivery of 
child welfare services. Additionally, tribes are eligible for a one time grant of up to 
$300,000 to offset the costs of developing and submitting the plan. 127 
§ 10.6.11 Adoption Incentives 
To encourage states to press for the adoption of foster children who are in need of 
adoption services, the Fostering Connections Act increases adoption incentive 
payments to states. Since the enactment of ASF A, states have been able to receive 
incentive payments for each adoption of an older child or a child with special needs 
above the state's base number of adoptions. The way this works is that the state has a 
base number of adoptions completed as of a certain date. For each adoption of an 
older child or a child with special needs beyond this base number, the state will be 
eligible to receive an incentive payment from the federal government. 
Fostering Connections enhances these payments in several ways. First, it 
increases adoption incentive payment to the state for each child adopted beyond the 
base number from $2000 to $4000. If the adopted child is a special needs child, the 
state will receive an additional $4000. Finally, when the adoption involves an older 
child the state will be eligible for the $4000 incentive payment plus an additional 
$8000 payment (note that this payment is only available for each adoption exceeding 
the state's base number of adoptions of older children). The intent of these incentives 
is to motivate the states to focus on the adoption of special needs and older children 
from the foster care system. 
§ 10.7 Child Well-Being Statutes 
Numerous federal statutes unrelated to preventing and responding to child 
maltreatment play a crucial role in supporting families and promoting child well-
being. Some of these establish federal programs to assist particular children or 
families (e.g., Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, and the 
food stamps program), while others provide block grants to the states to provide 
particular services (e.g., Social Services Block Grants (SSBG) and Maternal and 
Child Health Block grants). For this latter type of program, the state must establish the 
program, then individuals apply to the state to gain the benefit of the program. Some 
of these programs include at least some amount of direct funding for child welfare 
127 42 U.S.C. § 676(c). 
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purposes (e.g., Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Social Services Block 
Grants); others are supports generally available to assist categories of children and 
families, with some children and families who are involved in the child welfare 
system included in those categories (e.g., Child Care, Title I Education for the 
Disadvantaged). Some are open-ended entitlements, meaning that federal funding 
automatically expands or contracts annually to provide a defined benefit for all 
eligible persons (e.g., foster care, adoption assistances). Most programs are funded at 
specific levels rather than being limited only by the level of need (e.g., T ANF and 
SSBG). 
The following are the significant programs that provide assistance to qualifying 
individuals and include substantial child welfare services funding. 
§ 10.7.1 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
TANF is a block grant program created in 1996 to replace Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), which was an open-ended entitlement. 128 T ANF funds 
time-limited cash assistance to low income families with children. Receipt of T ANF 
funds is contingent on meeting work-hour requirements. The program provides some 
work supports for participants (e.g., training, child care, transportation). Most TANF 
beneficiaries are children living with their parents, but a substantial percentage are 
children residing with relatives, some of whom are placed with that relative as a result 
of a child welfare proceeding. Indeed, T ANF is a significant source of funding for 
child welfare services including support for children in relative placements as just 
mentioned, adoption, and related services. Additionally, individual states may choose 
to transfer a portion of their T ANF funds to the SSBG program under Title XX, which 
funds may be used to provide child welfare services. 
§ 10. 7 .2 Medicaid 
Medicaid is an entitlement program that provides health care benefits to low 
income persons. 129 Eligibility requirements, the specific services covered, and the 
level of reimbursement for medical services provided vary from state to state. 
Eligibility 
States are required to cover pregnant women and children under 6 years of age 
with a family income below 133% of the federally established poverty rate, and 
children between 5 and 19 years of age whose family income is below the poverty 
line. Individual states may choose to also cover pregnant women and children whose 
family income is between 133% and 185% of the federally established poverty line. 
States must also provide Medicaid benefits to recipients of Title N-E foster care and 
adoption assistance to age 18. Individual states may choose, under the Chaffee Act, to 
128 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619). 
129 42 U.S.C. §§ l396-1396v. 
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provide Medicaid benefits to young people who are or were in foster care to age 21. 
States may also choose to cover some children and youth who do not fall within these 
categories of recipients, and some states elect to provide services to foster children. 
States are prohibited from imposing cost sharing on services provided to children 
under age 18 or for services related to pregnancy. 
Benefits 
Medicaid includes both mandatory services (e.g., hospitalization, lab and x-ray 
fees, family planning and pregnancy-related services) and optional services (e.g., 
eyeglasses, prescription drugs, dental care, and case management). Those under age 
21 are entitled to receive preventative care through "Early and Periodic Screening, 
Diagnosis and Treatment," including comprehensive physical exams, immunizations, 
lead screening, vision and dental services, and other healthcare services necessary to 
address medical need identified through the exams. Children receiving Medicaid 
services may receive those services through managed care organizations. 
§ 10.7.3 State Children's Health Insurance Program 
In 1997 Congress enacted the State Children's Health Insurance Program 
(SCRIP). 130 The program was reauthorized and expanded to cover more children in 
2009. The SCHIP program establishes a defined federal financial commitment to 
provide medical care to children who are ineligible for Medicaid because their family 
income is too high yet who lack health insurance. Often these children hail from 
working poor families. Currently, the program covers children and youth under age 19 
whose families earn less that approximately $36,200 per years (for a family of 
four). 131 States may implement their SCHIP programs by expanding their Medicaid 
program, by establishing an entirely separate program, or by combining the two 
programs. 
§ 10.7.4 Supplemental Security Income 
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is a means tested program, 
administered by the federal government, which was established in 1972.132 To receive 
benefits under this program, the individual must meet income eligibility requirements 
and have a qualifying disability (e.g., physical handicap, mental illness, etc.). SSI is 
fully federally funded and individual states do not have to match the federal funds. 
130 Pub. L. No. I 05-33, l l l Stat. 25 l (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ l397aa-l397t). 
131 Robert Longley, Health Insurance for Uninsured Children: About the SCHIP Program, available at 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/medicarehealthinsurance/a/schip.htm. 
132 Pub. L. No. 92-603; 42 U.S.C. §§ l381-l383(d). 
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§ 10.7.5 Other Federal Programs 
In addition to the programs already discussed, there are numerous other programs 
that may provide aide to children and families involved in child welfare proceedings. 
These include: 
• Food Stamps - a means tested entitlement program. 133 
• The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children (WIC) - a non-entitlement program that provides nutritional 
support to low income pregnant women and their children to age 5. 134 
• Child Nutrition Program - funds, among other things, school breakfast 
and lunch programs. 135 
• Section 8 housing - not an entitlement program, but it provides rental 
assistance to low income persons. 136 
• The Child Care and Development Block Grant - provides child care 
assistance to low-income working parents. 137 
• Head Start - a non-entitlement program aimed at providing quality early 
childhood education and comprehensive services to low-income, pre-
school aged children. 138 
§ 10.8 Miscellaneous Federal Statutes 
In addition to the child welfare and child well-being legislation discussed above, 
child welfare lawyers should be aware that other federal statutes may impact your 
handling of child welfare cases. In this portion of this chapter, we will discuss two 
statutes of this sort. 
§ 10.8.1 Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 139 was enacted to address the long-
standing and pervasive discrimination against persons with physical and mental 
disabilities. 140 The statute intends to guarantee that persons with disabilities have the 
same access to services, programs, and activities as persons without disabilities. Thus, 
133 Pub. L. No. 88-525; 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036. 
134 42 U.S.C. § 1786. 
135 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1790. 
136 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-13664. 
137 42 U.S.C. § 9858. 
138 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9843a. 
139 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a){l). 
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the ADA requires that in certain circumstances public bodies make reasonable 
accommodations for persons with qualifying disabilities. 141 
There are three general areas of concern regarding the application of the ADA to 
child welfare cases. First, the ADA guarantees that all litigants have reasonable access 
to legal proceedings. 142 The states must make reasonable accommodations for parents 
and children with disabilities to ensure that they may participate in the proceedings. 
This would include such things as physical access to the courthouse and assistive 
listening devices or sign language interpreters for the deaf. 
The second area of concern relates to the substantive application of the ADA to 
efforts by state child welfare agencies to preserve and reunify families in which child 
maltreatment has occurred. It appears that the ADA does not directly apply to child 
welfare cases. 143 To the extent that the ADA applies in the child welfare context, most 
courts have held that proceedings involving the termination of parental rights do not 
constitute "services, programs and activities" within the meaning of the ADA, so the 
ADA does not act to bar proceedings to terminate parental rights. 144 Some courts have 
held that the ADA applies to a limited extent to child welfare proceedings. 145 These 
courts have generally held that if the state has met the "reasonable efforts" 
requirement it has also met the ADA' s "reasonable accommodation" requirement. 146 
Although the ADA may apply to the agency's efforts to reunify and the types of 
services offered, it does not provide a defense to a termination of parental rights 
action. 147 
Finally, the ADA applies to children who are the subject of child protective 
proceedings to protect them from discrimination based on a disability. For instance, a 
child care center must make an individualized determination as to whether a particular 
child's disability should be accommodated by the program. 148 
141 See42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq. 
142 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding against Eleventh Amendment immunity 
attack Title II of ADA requiring that disabled persons have access to courthouses and that their 
disabilities be accommodated so that they may participate in legal proceedings); see generally Peter 
Blanck, Ann Wilichowski & James Schmeling, Disability Civil Rights Law and Policy: Accessible 
Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 825 (2004). 
143 In re B.S., 166 Vt. 345, 693 A.2d 716, 720 (1997); State v Raymond C. (In re Torrance P.), 187 Wis. 
2d 10, 522 N.W.2d 243 (1994). 
144 Id.; see also Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 747 N.E.2d 120 (200 l); In re Anthony P., 84 Cal. 
App. 4th 1112, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423 (2000); Stone v. Daviess County Div. Child. & Fam. Servs., 
656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1995). 
145 See, e.g., In re Terry, 240 Mich. App. 14, 610 N.W.2d 563 (2000). 
146 See, e.g., J.T. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997); In re 
Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wash. App. 222, 896 P.2d 1302 (1995); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277 (Me. 
1995); In Interest ofC.M., 526 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa App. 1994). 
147 
See, e.g., People v. T.B., 12 P.3d 1221 (Colo. App. 2000); In re Terry, 240 Mich. App. 14, 610 
N.W.2d 563 (2000). 
148 
See U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Commonly Asked Questions About Child Care 
Centers and the Americans with Disabilities Act (Oct. 1997), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/childq&a.htrn. 
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§ 10.8.2 Children's Health Act of 2000 
The Children's Health Act of 2000 includes provisions regarding the rights of 
children who are placed in a "non-medical, community-based facility for children" 
such as group homes or residential treatment facilities. 149 The Act protects children 
placed in such facilities from physical or mental abuse, corporal punishment, and 
restraints or involuntary seclusion imposed for the purpose of discipline or for 
convenience. The statute strictly limits the use of restraints and seclusion to those 
members of the staff of such programs certified by the state and trained in taking such 
action. 150 
§ 10.9 Case Example: Applying Selected Federal 
Funding Streams and Statutory Requirements 
To understand how the various federal statutes interact, it may be instructive to 
consider them in the context of a specific child welfare case: 
Laura is a 22-year-old single young woman who is pregnant with her first child 
and is staying in the home of friends. Laura had an unfortunate childhood. Her mother 
is a long-standing polysubstance abuser whose drugs of choice are marijuana, 
cocaine, and alcohol, although she has sometimes used other substances. To support 
her drug habit, Laura's mother sometimes resorted to prostitution. During her 
childhood, Laura was sexually abused by several of her mother's male partners. Laura 
was removed from her mother's care at the age of 11 and placed into the foster care 
system. By the time she aged out of foster care at 18, Laura had lived in nine foster 
homes, a residential treatment facility, and a group home. Laura did not finish high 
school and has struggled with homelessness and poverty since her emancipation. 
Although Laura has no contact with her baby's father at this time, he is a 38-year-old 
man she met in her neighborhood. 
Because she is living in poverty, Laura receives public assistance under the TANF 
program and receives monthly food stamps, as well. Also, because of her pregnancy, 
she is eligible to receive supplemental nutritional services through the WIC program. 
In addition to these more general services, because there is an elevated risk of child 
abuse or neglect, Laura is eligible to receive nurse home-visitor services paid for by 
Title IV-B's Promoting Safe and Stable Families program as well as early 
intervention services provided through CAPT A. The nurse home-visitor provides 
educational support to Laura about her pregnancy, provides developmental infor-
mation about the baby Laura will soon have, and acts as a conduit to other services. 
For instance, the nurse referred Laura to the local housing office for Section 8 
housing. Unfortunately, there are no current housing units available, and the wait list 
is long. 
149 42 U.S.C. § 290jj. 
ISO 42 u.s.c. § 290jj. 
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Despite these efforts, at the time Laura gave birth to her son, Michael, he was 
born with both THC and cocaine metabolites in his system. When interviewed by a 
hospital social worker, Laura admitted that she smoked marijuana off and on 
throughout her pregnancy-most recently three days before her delivery-and used 
cocaine only the day before giving birth to Michael. Michael was born two weeks 
prematurely, although he is 5 pounds and 13 ounces. While in the hospital, he 
experienced some mild tremors and rigidity, which the doctors ascribe to his prenatal 
exposure to illicit drugs. Because of Michael's condition, CAPTA's mandatory 
reporting law, which has been integrated into the state's child protection law, the 
doctor who attended his birth files the necessary report with children's protective 
services. A caseworker is assigned to investigate the report-which is financially 
supported, in part, by CAPT A. 
The worker interviews Laura and observes Michael. During the interview, Laura 
explains that her drug use is the result of the stress of her pregnancy and her poverty. 
She has no place to go because her friends have informed her that she cannot return to 
live with them. She says that she very much wants help for her drug usage and that 
she desperately wants to raise Michael and does not want him placed into foster care. 
At the conclusion of the worker's investigation, he substantiates that Michael is a 
neglected child. He files a petition with the local family court and, accessing funds 
provided through Title IV-E by the Fostering Connections Act, and after an assess-
ment of her needs, he places Laura into a residential drug treatment program where 
Michael will join her when he is ready for release from the hospital in a few days. 
Because a court petition was filed, the court, consistent with the requisite 
provisions of CAPT A, appoints an attorney to represent Michael's interests as his 
guardian ad litem. At the initial hearing, held within 48 hours of the filing of the 
petition, the court finds that there is sufficient evidence of neglect to permit the case 
to proceed, that reasonable efforts were made or were unnecessary to preserve the 
family, and that placement with Laura without court intervention would be contrary to 
Michael's welfare, meeting the requirements of Title IV-E. Under state law, Michael 
"entered" foster care on the day the court authorized the case to proceed, so the state 
must conduct a permanency planning hearing in 12 months unless the case is resolved 
earlier. 
Michael is released from the hospital and is placed with Laura in the drug 
treatment program. Laura is very happy that she is able to see her son daily and to 
parent him, although she quickly learns that it will be difficult to care for him while 
working to overcome her addiction. Her daily therapy sessions are very difficult as 
she begins to deal with the underlying traumas that have led her to use drugs. Laura's 
substance abuse related treatment is paid for, in part, by the state's substance abuse 
block grant while other portions of her treatment are covered under the state's Title 
XX Social Services Block Grant, and Michael's well baby visits are paid for by 
Medicaid. She continues to receive WIC, which pays for Michael's formula. 
The residential program is designed to last 90 days to six months depending on 
the severity of the parent's substance abuse. For the first couple of weeks, Laura does 
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well. But as her treatment proceeds, she finds it harder to confront her past and to 
work through the trauma she has experienced. The stress is enormous and she 
sometimes lacks the energy to care for Michael. When a staff member of the program 
raises this issue with her, she has an angry outburst and leaves the program, leaving 
Michael behind. The program immediately contacts the CPS worker. The worker is 
unaware of any relative who could care for Michael, so he is placed into a foster home 
on an emergency basis while the worker seeks out possible relatives with which to 
place Michael. When Laura returns to the program three days later, she is informed 
that she has been expelled and Michael placed in foster care. She meets with her 
worker and identifies several members of her extended family who may be able to 
provide for Michael. Consistent with federal law as adopted by the state, Michael is 
shortly thereafter placed in the home of Laura's aunt who will pursue foster care 
licensing, a placement which is supported, in part, by Title IV-E funds. 
By this time, the workers, using the federally funded parent locator system, have 
contacted Michael's father, William. Paternity is established but William indicates 
that he is in no position to care for his son. He relates an extensive history of drug 
usage, a long criminal record including two convictions for domestic violence, and a 
general unwillingness to parent the baby. 
The court case proceeds. Michael is adjudicated a neglected child after Laura and 
William each admit various allegations in the agency's petition. Michael's placement 
continues to be funding through Title IV-E. Also consistent with the Fostering 
Connections Act, the agency makes a concerted effort to identify other relatives on 
both sides of Michael's family, and several other potential relative caregivers are 
identified. These relatives are provided notice of the proceeding. 
At the dispositional hearing, the agency recommends, and the court adopts, a 
permanency goal of reunification with Laura. By this time, she has reentered drug 
treatment, albeit in an intensive outpatient program. She is ordered to continue and 
complete the substance abuse treatment program, undergo psychological and 
psychiatric assessments, and to follow any recommendations regarding medication 
and mental health treatment, to complete parenting classes and, to visit Michael at 
least two times per week under the supervision of her aunt. Her substance abuse 
treatment is paid for from Title XX and from state funds received through the federal 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, and the other services 
are paid for by IV-E funds as matched with state money. 
After a couple of months in treatment, Laura again drops out. She continues to 
visit Michael; however, her aunt reports that she is belligerent and has come to some 
of the visits appearing to be intoxicated. The aunt reports that at the last visit Laura 
showed up with a man who scared the aunt and who, like Laura, was obviously high. 
The aunt is fed up and is no longer willing to care for Michael because of Laura's 
behavior. The aunt says she believes a different permanent plan needs to be made for 
Michael. 
The agency convenes a case meeting with the relevant parties to consider options. 
At the meeting are the workers, Michael's guardian ad I item, Laura, and several 
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relatives. There is a consensus that Laura has not made adequate progress. It is 
decided that the time has come, consistent with the ASF A, to institute a concurrent 
plan for Michael. He needs to be placed in a placement that will commit to providing 
for him permanently in the event that Laura or William cannot regain custody. Laura 
says she has heard on the street that William is back in prison on a parole violation. 
Unfortunately, for one reason or another, none of the relatives is willing to commit to 
caring for Michael permanently. No other relatives can be identified, so Michael is 
placed with foster parents who are interested in adopting a child. Laura again insists 
that she wants to get clean and care for Michael, so she re-enters drug treatment. 
Within a few weeks, however, Laura again drops out of treatment, and her 
whereabouts are unknown. Meanwhile, Michael has begun to show signs of develop-
mental delay, which medical professionals attributed at least in part to prenatal 
exposure to illicit drugs. Another case conference is held. Michael's lawyer explains 
that she recently attended some training funded by Title IV-E in which early 
termination of parental rights was one of the issues discussed. She believes the 
permanency goal should change to termination of parental rights and adoption. The 
workers were resistant. Even if Laura could get clean, the lawyer argued, she would 
not be able to meet Michael's special needs. 
In the end, the worker agrees, and a termination petition was filed. At the pretrial 
hearing on the petition, the judge referred the matter to the county's new child 
protection mediation program. Laura had resurfaced and agreed to appear at the 
mediation. After carefully listening to the workers and Michael's lawyer, Laura 
agreed that it was not fair to Michael to have to wait longer for her to be in a position 
to care for him. After consulting with her attorney, she decided to release her parental 
rights. 
A hearing was scheduled at which Laura released her parental rights. William's 
rights were involuntarily terminated. Michael is adopted by his foster parents. 
Because of his special needs, the foster parents will be eligible for a Title IV-E funded 
adoption subsidy, which will provide both a cash subsidy and Medicaid to help 
provide for his needs throughout his childhood. 
§ 10.10 Conclusion 
Since the federal government entered the child protection and foster care arena in 
the 1960s, its role and influence has steadily expanded. As the case of Laura and 
Michael demonstrates, today virtually no aspect of a child welfare case is free of the 
impact of federal law, either directly or indirectly. Thus, it is incumbent upon child 
welfare law practitioners, whether representing the child, the parents, or the agency, to 
be intimately familiar with the workings of the various federal statutes in the field. 
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